Can merely thinking about an imaginary situation provide evidence for how the world actually is--or how it ought to be? In this lively book, Roy A. Sorensen addresses this question with an analysis of a wide variety of thought experiments ranging from aesthetics to zoology. Presenting the first general theory of thought experiment, he sets it within an evolutionary framework and integrates recent advances in experimental psychology and the history of science, with special emphasis on Ernst Mach and Thomas (...) Kuhn. Sorensen explores what thought experiments are, how they work, and what their virtues and vices are. In his view, philosophy differs from science in degree, but not in kind. For this reason, he claims, it is possible to understand philosophical thought experiments by concentrating on their resemblance to scientific relatives. Sorensen assesses the hazards of thought experiments and grants that there are interesting ways in which the method leads us astray, but attacks most scepticism about thought experiments as arbitrary. He maintains that they should be used--as they generally are--as part of a diversified portfolio of techniques, creating a network of cross-checks that make for impressive reliability. (shrink)

Current fears of a “reproducibility crisis” have led researchers, sources of scientific funding, and the public to question both the efficacy and trustworthiness of science. Suggested policy changes have been focused on statistical problems, such as p-hacking, and issues of experimental design and execution. However, “reproducibility” is a broad concept that includes a number of issues. Furthermore, reproducibility failures occur even in fields such as mathematics or computer science that do not have statistical problems or issues with experimental design. (...) Most importantly, these proposed policy changes ignore a core feature of the process of scientific inquiry that occurs after reproducibility failures: the integration of conflicting observations and ideas into a coherent theory. (shrink)

BackgroundVarious forms of Clinical Ethics Support (CES) have been developed in health care organizations. Over the past years, increasing attention has been paid to the question of how to foster the quality of ethics support. In the Netherlands, a CES quality assessment project based on a responsive evaluation design has been implemented. CES practitioners themselves reflected upon the quality of ethics support within each other’s health care organizations. This study presents a qualitative evaluation of this Responsive Quality Assessment (RQA) (...) project.MethodsCES practitioners’ experiences with and perspectives on the RQA project were collected by means of ten semi-structured interviews. Both the data collection and the qualitative data analysis followed a stepwise approach, including continuous peer review and careful documentation of the decisions.ResultsThe main findings illustrate the relevance of the RQA with regard to fostering the quality of CES by connecting to context specific issues, such as gaining support from upper management and to solidify CES services within health care organizations. Based on their participation in the RQA, CES practitioners perceived a number of changes regarding CES in Dutch health care organizations after the RQA: acknowledgement of the relevance of CES for the quality of care; CES practices being more formalized; inspiration for developing new CES-related activities and more self-reflection on existing CES practices.ConclusionsThe evaluation of the RQA shows that this method facilitates an open learning process by actively involving CES practitioners and their concrete practices. Lessons learned include that “servant leadership” and more intensive guidance of RQA participants may help to further enhance both the critical dimension and the learning process within RQA. (shrink)

We can best begin from Wilson's "simple little puzzle" about Caesar and Antony: "What would the world be like if Julius Caesar had all the properties of Mark Antony and Mark Antony had all the properties of Julius Caesar?" Wilson's own approach to an answer is indirect--he begins by telling us not what such a world would be like but what it would look like. "Clearly the world would look exactly the same under our supposition." But this assumes that the (...) question "What would such a world look like?" is a proper one; which it surely is not. For his answer to it is meaningless until he specifies to whom this supposed world would look as he says it would. It would look exactly the same to him or to me; but would it have looked the same to Caesar or to Antony? In fact Julius Caesar had the experiences of being called "Julius Caesar," being murdered on the Ides of March, and so on, and these are very different experiences from being called "Mark Antony," dallying on the Nile with Cleopatra, and so on; so I don't see how this alternative course of events could possibly have looked the same to Julius Caesar; or--using a similar line of argument--to Mark Antony. So I cannot agree that, as Wilson goes on to say, "our attempt to describe a distinct possible world has produced just the same old world all over again." I am not, indeed, convinced that even a world which looked to everyone just as the actual one does would necessarily be the same world ; but even putting this doubt aside, since the world mentioned wouldn't look to everyone as the actual world does, it wouldn't be the same even by Wilson's own standards. (shrink)

In this bold and innovative new work, A.W. Moore poses the question of whether it is possible for ethical thinking to be grounded in pure reason. In order to understand and answer this question, he takes a refreshing and challenging look at Kant’s moral and religious philosophy. Identifying three Kantian Themes – morality, freedom and religion – and presenting variations on each of these themes in turn, Moore concedes that there are difficulties with the Kantian view that morality (...) can be governed by ‘pure’ reason. He does however defend a closely related view involving a notion of reason as socially and culturally conditioned. In the course of doing this, Moore considers in detail, ideas at the heart of Kant’s thought, such as the categorical imperative, free will, evil, hope, eternal life and God. He also makes creative use of the ideas in contemporary philosophy, both within the analytic tradition and outside it, such as ‘thick’ ethical concepts, forms of life and ‘becoming those that we are’. Throughout the book, a guiding precept is that to be rational is to make sense, and that nothing is of greater value to use than making sense. (shrink)

This paper seeks to question the position of ZF as the dominant system of set theory, and in particular to examine whether there is any philosophical justification for the axiom of foundation. After some historical observations regarding Poincare and Russell, and the notions of circularity and hierarchy, the iterative conception of set is argued to be a semi-constructvist hybrid without philosophical coherence. ZF cannot be justified as necessary to avoid paradoxes, as axiomatizing a coherent notion of set, nor on (...) pragmatic grounds, and should be replaced by a system allowing non-well-founded sets. (shrink)

Rather than entailing that a particular outcome will occur, many scientific theories only entail that an outcome will occur with a certain probability. Because scientific evidence inevitably falls short of conclusive proof, when choosing between different theories it is standard to make reference to how probable the various options are in light of the evidence. A full understanding of probability in science needs to address both the role of probabilities in theories, or chances, as well as the role of probabilistic (...) judgment in theory choice. In this chapter, the author introduces and distinguishes the two sorts of probability from one another and attempt to offer a satisfactory characterization of how the different uses for probability in science are to be understood. A closing section turns to the question of how views about the chance of some outcome should guide our confidence in that outcome. (shrink)

Everyday there are revelations of organizations behaving in discreditable ways. Sometimes these actions result in damage to an organization's reputation, but often they do not. In this article, we examine the question of why external stakeholders may overlook disclosed discreditable actions, even those entailing ethical breaches. Drawing on stigmatization theory, we develop a model to explain the likelihood of reputational loss following revelations of discreditable actions. The model integrates four properties of actions (perceived control, perceived certainty, perceived threat, and (...) perceived deviance), stakeholder motivation, and media coverage. Implications for theory and for practitioners concerned with reputation management are discussed. (shrink)

A model in which strongness ofκ is indestructible under κ+ -weakly closed forcing notions satisfying the Prikry condition is constructed. This is applied to solve a question of Hajnal on the number of elements of {λ δ |2 δ <λ}.

The question of whether externalism about mental content is compatible with privileged access is a question of ongoing concern within philosophy of mind. Some philosophers think that Tyler Burge's early work on what he calls "basic self-knowledge" shows that externalism and privileged access are compatible. I critically assess this claim, arguing that Burge's work does not establish the compatbility thesis.

Darwin's greatest accomplishment was to show how life might be explained as the result of natural selection. But does Darwin's theory mean that life was unintended? William A. Dembski argues that it does not. In this book Dembski extends his theory of intelligent design. Building on his earlier work in The Design Inference (Cambridge, 1998), he defends that life must be the product of intelligent design. Critics of Dembski's work have argued that evolutionary algorithms show that life can be explained (...) apart from intelligence. But by employing powerful recent results from the No Free Lunch Theory, Dembski addresses and decisively refutes such claims. As the leading proponent of intelligent design, Dembski reveals a designer capable of originating the complexity and specificity found throughout the cosmos. Scientists and theologians alike will find this book of interest as it brings the question of creation firmly into the realm of scientific debate. (shrink)

Simpson introduced the lattice of Π0 1 classes under Medvedev reducibility. Questions regarding completeness in are related to questions about measure and randomness. We present a solution to a question of Simpson about Medvedev degrees of Π0 1 classes of positive measure that was independently solved by Simpson and Slaman. We then proceed to discuss connections to constructive logic. In particular we show that the dual of does not allow an implication operator (i.e. that is not a Heyting algebra). (...) We also discuss properties of the class of PA-complete sets that are relevant in this context. (shrink)

Question order effects are commonly observed in self-report measures of judgment and attitude. This article develops a quantum question order model (the QQ model) to account for four types of question order effects observed in literature. First, the postulates of the QQ model are presented. Second, an a priori, parameter-free, and precise prediction, called the QQ equality, is derived from these mathematical principles, and six empirical data sets are used to test the prediction. Third, a new index (...) is derived from the model to measure similarity between questions. Fourth, we show that in contrast to the QQ model, Bayesian and Markov models do not generally satisfy the QQ equality and thus cannot account for the reported empirical data that support this equality. Finally, we describe the conditions under which order effects are predicted to occur, and we review a broader range of findings that are encompassed by these very same quantum principles. We conclude that quantum probability theory, initially invented to explain order effects on measurements in physics, appears to be a powerful natural explanation for order effects of self-report measures in social and behavioral sciences, too. (shrink)

Robert Brandom's normative-pragmatic theory is intended to represent the minimal set of practical abilities whose exhibition qualifies creatures as speaking a language. His model of a minimally discursive practice (MDP) is one in which participants, devoid of logical vocabulary, are only capable of making assertions and drawing inferences. This dissertation argues that Brandom's purely assertional practices are not MDPs and that speech acts of asking questions (queries) must be included in any practice that counts as an MDP. I propose several (...) novel alternations to Brandom's deontic scorekeeping model of discourse, which I then utilize to generate a normative-pragmatic analysis of inquisitive practices. This analysis supports the claim that agents who can assert need to be able to ask questions and vice versa. The upshot is that intentionality belongs to those who can ask and answer questions. (shrink)

Recent interdisciplinary research in visual stylometry employs digital image analysis algorithms to study the image features and statistics that underwrite our experience of artworks. This research brings psychologists, computer scientists, and art historians together to explore the formal image qualities that define artistic style. We introduce the field of visual stylometry, discuss it's implications for our understanding of both the nature of categories of art and the role artistic style plays in our engagement with artworks. We then discuss the results (...) of our research employing entropy analyses and discrete tonal analyses to classify paintings by school (Impressionism/Hudson River School) and medium/technique (Wyeth/egg-tempura/watercolor). (shrink)

The thirteenth century mystic Ibn ʻArabi was the foremost Sufi theorist of the premodern era. For more than a century, Western scholars and esotericists have heralded his universalism, arguing that he saw all contemporaneous religions as equally valid. In Rethinking Ibn ʻArabi, Gregory Lipton calls this image into question and throws into relief how Ibn ʻArabi's discourse is inseparably intertwined with the absolutist vision of his own religious milieu-- that is, the triumphant claim that Islam fulfilled, superseded, and therefore (...) abrogated all previous revealed religions. Lipton juxtaposes Ibn ʻArabi's absolutist conception with the later reception of his ideas, exploring how they have been read, appropriated, and universalized within the reigning interpretive field of Perennial Philosophy in the study of Sufism. The contours that surface through this comparative analysis trace the discursive practices that inform Ibn ʻArabi's Western reception back to the eighteenth and nineteenth century study of 'authentic' religion, where European ethno-racial superiority was wielded against the Semitic Other - both Jewish and Muslim. Lipton argues that supersessionist models of exclusivism are buried under contemporary Western constructions of religious authenticity in ways that ironically mirror Ibn ʻArabi's medieval absolutism. (shrink)

Theoretical economics should not be divorced from real life. If theoretical research cannot provide a good explanation for real-world economic phenomena, then we have to question the appropriateness of the paradigm that our theoretical research follows. The battle between neoclassical macroeconomics and Keynesian economics has exposed the inadequacy of the paradigm that modern mainstream economics has followed. Neoclassical macroeconomics and Keynesian economics have the same microeconomic basis. However, the paradigm of the microeconomics on which they are based has serious (...) flaws—the scarcity hypothesis and the economic man hypothesis—do not conform to the facts. These two hypotheses are the basis for other hypotheses and principles, but neither of these two hypotheses holds up to scrutiny. Then the economics edifice built on this foundation is certainly unstable, and the corresponding economic policies are certainly not perfect. (shrink)

The future of any society, its moral climate, is determined by what happens in the souls of the younger generation. The most responsible mission for the formation of a spiritually developed personality, and therefore the level of spirituality of society as a whole, is entrusted to education as a social branch. The main task of the modern school is to form a new person of the biosocial level, who would live and act in accordance with the universal laws of the (...) Cosmos. It is for this purpose that education must be made so that the priority in it belongs to the question of the formation and development of the spiritual ideal. This issue has always been at the forefront of time and has been given considerable attention. There are many views on the ways and methods of accomplishing this task. (shrink)

This essay identifies and intervenes in the limitations of both the social and the medical models of disability in the postcolonial context, suggesting that those limitations may apply to theorizations of disability more broadly. It suggests that Bessie Head's novel A Question of Power, which represents mental illness and disability without positing a stable etiology for them, illustrates the inapplicability of these ways of thinking about disability under instances of extreme precarity. As such, Head offers a test case for (...) how mental illness and disability writ large might be theorized without the suppositions implicit to the liberal subject. (shrink)

La seconde moitié du XX° siècle a été marquée par un certain renou­veau de la théologie. Un tel renouveau est dû, pour une large part, à une sorte de renversement d'ordre épistémologique: à la certitude du mes­sager d'une possession de la vérité que l'homme pécheur ne voudrait pas reconnaître, s'est substituée la question du destinataire du message chré­tien, de ses attentes, de son langage. Ainsi la théologie s'est trouvée confrontée à toutes les connaissances et anthropologies élaborées depuis que le (...) savoir ne prend plus seulement ses sources dans un savoir théolo­gique. Du coup surgit une nouvelle question, redoutable: le message du Christianisme peut-il se satisfaire des résultats de ces savoirs, au risque de l'incompatibilité et de sa propre insignifiance ? Le but de cet article est d'examiner comment les sciences de l'homme interfèrent avec le dis­cours théologique dès qu'on se soucie de ceux à qui ce discours s'adresse.Pour cela sont présentées, à travers quelques oeuvres, des tentatives déjà réalisées pour les conditions d'un dialogue , pour situer la théologie dans une situation et pour la critique de ses expressions .The second half of the 20th centurv was marked by a certain renewal of theology.Such a renewal is due, in large part, to a sort of overturning of the epistemological order :for the certitude of the messenger of the possession of the truth that sinful man did not want to recognize, there was substituted the question of the receiver of the Christian message, of its expectations, of its language. As a result theology found itself « confronted with all the learning and anthropologies that have been elaborated since knowledge no longer took its sources in just a theological knowledge. Suddenly a new question arises that is formidable : can the message of Christianity be satisfied with the results of this knowledge, at the risk of an incompatibility and of its own insignificance ? The aim of this article is to examine how the human sciences mix with theological discourse once those to whom this discourse is addressed become concerned. That is why the author presents, through a few works, the attempts already realized for the conditions of a dialogue , in order to situate theology in a situation , and for the critique of its expressions. (shrink)

How can it be explained that we are able to be captivated by fictions and to sympathize with characters about whom we know that they are merely the figments of someone's imagination ? In the current debate about this question it is often taken for granted that the interest in fiction is a peculiar deviation from something which is to be considered as perfectly rational and normal, viz. our interest in what really happened. In this article, however, I try (...) to describe a perspective from which our interest in what really happened turns out to be as paradoxical and peculiar as our interest in fiction. According to a second presupposition — which is often taken for granted in the current discussion — the desires and emotions, evoked by fictions, would be some kind of pretending. At first sight our interest in fiction is strikingly similar to daydreams and other forms of mild self-deception. But this similarity is misleading : some fictions are great works of art and it would be contradictory to suppose that the response to their artistic value should be rooted in a lack of lucidity. A genuine aesthetic experience is contemplative and contemplation is to be considered as lucidity — as ‘concentration without elimination’. In the final part of the article I try to explain how the interest in artistic fictions can be related to the traditional ideal of contemplation. (shrink)

The classical formulations given to the problem of free will and determinism in analytical philosophy can be split into two groups according to a double function of the element : „to be able to act otherwise”. In the first case we speak of „the problem of autonomy” and in the second of „the problem of justifying punishment”. Both formulations are inadequate. „The problem of autonomy” is wrongly formulated, since determinism does not threaten our possibilities. „The problem of justifying punishment” is (...) likewise a wrong formulation, since the question of „being able to act otherwise” merely has a secondary role in the attribution of guilt. Nevertheless certain elements can be found in both formulations to provide us with a new formulation and it is in this direction that we should like to move. (shrink)

The key to understanding ourselves and the disenchantment of our world, is in fact the age-old logic of religion. This thesis is at the heart of the thought of Marcel Gauchet. For Gauchet, the growing departing from religion that characterises contemporary Western culture is made possible by the logic of religion itself, through its different historical re-articulations, in close interplay with the logic of the political it has given rise to. In a sense, this logic continues to shape our social (...) universe, but now in a way exactly opposite to its original form. The disenchantment of the world is thus not a movement againstreligion, but on the contrary a movement made possible by religion itself. Christianity especially has played a central rôle in all this: it is, in the famous formulation of Gauchet, “the religion for the departing from religion”. In this article, this whole complex movement is reconstructed in its essential steps: the rise of the state and its revolutionary implications for religion, the growth of the ‘higher religions’ and the dynamics of transcendence, the specificity of Christianity , opening up the possibility of a radically new and now disenchanted articulation of autonomy and heteronomy. Further, the background is examined from which Gauchet’s theory has taken shape , as well as the relation between Gauchet and other ‘theories of secularisation’, such as those of Weber, Blumenberg or Löwith. A critical assessment is made of Gauchet’s ‘political’ reading of religion, of its methodological presuppositions, and of his definition of ‘religion’ itself. Finally, the question is raised as to the future of religion according to this theory, and especially the future of Christianity. (shrink)

According to the Incommensurability Thesis (IT) superseding scientific theories (paradigms) are incommensurable. Unlike many authors we do not discuss whether there is a relationship of this kind. We take for granted that this may be the case, and see the problem in the endeavour to establish the domain of validity of the IT. The notion incommensurability (Ic) is derivative from the concepts of scientific paradigm (P) and scientific revolution (R). There are several concepts of P, as well as various conceptions (...) of R. The Ic concept also has more than one meaning. The validity of the IT is restricted to a subset of P, R, and Ic. From the viewpoint of P this may be the case with (a) substantially different competing general conceptions not reformulated with a view to make them comparable, as well as with (b) scientific communities dogmatically committed to such conceptions. From the viewpoint of R this takes place when we have to do with big revolutions, i.e. superseding conceptions with prevailing discontinuity. Lastly, from the point of view of Ic proper: when it is meant a weak Ic, i.e. a particular incomparability (incompatibility) between the conceptions in question. (shrink)

Health care professionals often face moral dilemmas. Not dealing constructively with moral dilemmas can cause moral distress and can negatively affect the quality of care. Little research has been documented with methodologies meant to support professionals in care for the homeless in dealing with their dilemmas. Moral case deliberation is a method for systematic reflection on moral dilemmas and is increasingly being used as ethics support for professionals in various health-care domains. This study deals with the question: What is (...) the contribution of MCD in helping professionals in an institution for care for the homeless to deal with their moral dilemmas? A mixed-methods responsive evaluation design was used to answer the research question. Five teams of professionals from a Dutch care institution for the homeless participated in MCD three times. Professionals in care for the homeless value MCD positively. They report that MCD helped them to identify the moral dilemma/question, and that they learned from other people’s perspectives while reflecting and deliberating on the values at stake in the dilemma or moral question. They became aware of the moral dimension of moral dilemmas, of related norms and values, of other perspectives, and learned to formulate a moral standpoint. Some experienced the influence of MCD in the way they dealt with moral dilemmas in daily practice. Half of the professionals expect MCD will influence the way they deal with moral dilemmas in the future. Most of them were in favour of further implementation of MCD in their organization. (shrink)

In this book, I will discuss three main topics: the roots and aims of scientific knowledge, scientific knowledge in society, and science and values I understand scientific knowledge as being a planned and continuous production of the general and common knowledge of scientific communities. I begin my discussion with a brief analysis of the main differences between sciences, on the one hand, and everyday experience, philosophies, religions, and ideologies, on the other. I define the concept of science as a set (...) of family resemblances (in Wittgenstein's sense). The sciences can be distinguished along three lines, in terms of the difference between empirical and non-empirical sciences, differences in degrees of theoretical and methodological structure among individual sciences and scientific disciplines. Scientific knowledge is based upon some grounds, paradigmatic knowledge bases. Scientific knowledge is founded on a unified paradigmatic knowledge base. The latter includes fundamental theories, basic facts, generally accepted empirical regularities (laws), scientific research methods, scientific explanations, and established relations to other sciences. Scientific knowledge in general is defined well in classical terms by the definition that knowledge is a true and rationally-justified belief. In this connection, scientific truth is relative, depending on the given paradigmatic knowledge base and on the precision and accessibility of the measurements and observations involved. In the book's first part, I consider the production and testing of scientific hypotheses, scientific explanations, the structure of scientific theories, and the problem of scientific realism. I consider explanation an integral part of a wider nexus of heuristic and theoretical activities in science like giving reasons, understanding, clarification, and founding. Continuous production of scientific explanations is a necessary condition for the systematic reproduction of scientific knowledge. Accordingly, it does not suffice to describe them in terms of the logical structure of the arguments on which they are based, but rather, scientific explanations ought to be given complete with an epistemic and pragmatic context of the explanation. I consider especially deductive-nomological, inductive-statistical, dispositional, teleological-functional, and genetic explanations. I emphasize the ever-increasing importance of explanations by analogy and by model. Orthogonal to these distinctions lies the distinction between causal and epistemic explanation. Epistemic explanations relate scientific discoveries to epistemic progress, and causal explanations are these epistemic explanations that relate scientific discoveries to reality too. Causal explanations inform us that certain changes occur in the world as agents of other changes, or rather, that certain changes are real consequences of other changes. Thus, by having explanations of causes, we can intervene in the world to induce by design certain changes in some course of phenomena. I consider scientific theories as logically and epistemically ordered wholeness of scientific knowledge in a realm of research that enables us to construct useful models of reality. After the discussion of different 'statement' views on theories and different interpretations of the theory-experience relation, I introduce the 'model' theoretical (non-statement) views on theories, especially the structural theory of science. The model views on theories transcend the realism-antirealism dualism by introducing models between theory and reality. Therefore, the question of scientific realism is not merely whether and, if so, which element(s), of scientific theories represent reality, but rather which conditions suffice to infer from a theory that one of its models truly expresses reality. In other words, under which conditions do models of a theory represent models of reality? Generally, models are just as much images of reality in a theory as they are images of a theory in reality. The actual problem of scientific realism doesn't originate in the observable-unobservable distinction (even if this distinction is otherwise theoretically loaded), but rather in ontological quandaries, of the sort especially encountered in modern physical theories such as quantum mechanics, relativity theory, and cosmological theories, although they are known to arise in other sciences as well. Scientific theories may be real, even if they describe nothing about the world. However, such theories can be given this status only if their formal, mathematical postulates exhibit some formal homology between reality and mathematical forms. The very fact that it is possible to describe reality with the help of mathematics even in cases, where every (representational, conceptual) language and thought fall short, would indicate that even mathematics itself is, in some sense, a part of reality, although 'outside' of the empirical world. It follows we have to distinguish the non-empirical reality and the empirical world. Formal objectivity and non-arbitrariness of theories do not emerge from either our language or thoughts, or from the world of facts, causes, and effects, but rather from non-empirical reality, which frames the world as some kind of objective transcendental condition for the possibility of the existence of the world, thoughts, and language. In the second part of the book, I consider the incorporation of scientific work and scientific knowledge into modern society and its relations to values and ethics. Production of scientific knowledge goes on as a parallel distributed process of a special kind of social (shared) cognition. The central part of this cognition is the presentation of parts of the world by scientific (theoretical) models which are warranted by the shared and public practice of justification, and in reflective acting in the world as it would. I consider various formal concepts of collective propositional knowledge (distributed, mutual, common knowledge). Scientific knowledge is an achievement to be ascribed to a scientific community or, indirectly, to all those who apply or expand it, rather than to individuals per se. It presents the continuous and partially planned production of non-trivial common knowledge of the research communities in modern societies. However, besides common knowledge, shared dispositional knowledge (knowledge how of scientific teams) and shared knowledge by acquiring (knowledge of fundamental similarities and differences in scientific teams) are parts of the real body of scientific knowledge. Scientific common knowledge implies the projection into idealized universal knowledge of all real or potentially rational and well-informed individuals. The respect of scientific knowledge thus presents the norm of rationality. Science as the intensively shared and socially distributed kind of cognition enters into modern society as a special kind of work (general work), as a productive force (social invention drive), and as a form of capital (human, social, cultural, informational, etc.). However any of these categories can adequately represent the socio-economical role of science in modern societies, and we are still waiting for a more adequate general concept that would theoretically cover the 'scientification' of modern societies. My thesis is that the most important general effect of scientification is (and will be) the growth of social processes that structurally resemble parallel distributed shared social cognition of science, and not so much the rise of the use of scientific knowledge and scientifically based information in all kinds of production. Scientification of modern societies inevitably includes a much stronger need for moral and social responsibility of scientists for their work and its effects in their local society and the global world. This need comes in contradiction with the quite large accepted idea (and even the 'norm') on value-free research. I discuss to some degree different arguments for the absence of non-epistemic values and ethical reasoning from science and find them non-convincing. The sound idea of value-free research lies in the need for the absence of categorical value statements from scientific explanations and theoretical deductions. Values and ethical judgment have, and sometimes they even have to play an important role in another part of research and its application in science or outside it. Not the value-loudness of research is a danger for science but its blind, non-reflective use. It leads to the ideologization and politicization of science. A similar danger lies in the purely value-neutrality of research. It leads to the instrumentalization of science to the technical or bureaucratic means for 'any' aims. (shrink)

Economists generally associate the redistribution of resources with the apparatus of taxes and transfer payments. Such redistributions are done by the power of the authorities. However, resources are redistributed by other means as well. People give away income in a variety of ways, deliberate and unintentional. In this paper, agents transfer consumption goods in return for a good which lacks material qualities and affects their preferences because it has “value”. An example of a real life commodity without intrinsic value is (...) diamonds. The standard consumption value of a diamond is low, especially as artificial diamonds look the same as real ones to the naked eye. Many luxury goods such as art pieces have similar characteristics. Owning a house in a “rich” area could have extra benefits in consumption and, yet, one important motivation is simply to live in an expensive neighborhood. By holding such a good an agent refrains from acquiring resources that he could consume and, thus, frees resources for other agents. Our thinking on this issue originates from a naive question. Why are wealthy people striving to be wealthier? It is quite absurd to think that rich people wish to increase the consumption of standard goods as assumed in the classical consumer model. Indeed, by acquiring an expensive diamond or an original piece of art, a consumer demonstrates his avoidance of consumption. We construct and analyse an elementary competitive equilibrium model in which the value of “useless” jewels enter the preferences of consumers. We show that if jewels are scarce, they can trade at a positive price despite having no intrinsic utility. Under fairly natural assumptions, a positive price equilibrium redistributes consumption from the rich to the poor. Thus, the model demonstrates the common wisdom that the existence of luxury goods can have a positive effect on income distribution. This paper is mainly expository. The idea of consumption goods lacking intrinsic value and of prices entering directly the utility functions is not original.. (shrink)

An issue in current animal welfare ethics is the use of animals in medical education. At stake is the conflict of pain and suffering of the animals vs. the benefit to the students. The educator's role is to balance these two concepts. If the animals do suffer, this has to be justified by clearly establishing the necessity of their use. Neither this justification nor the methods for making the decision are clear. Addressed in this discussion are the arguments for and (...) against animal use, alternatives, and proposals for the resolution of the controversy. (shrink)

BackgroundHuman genome editing technologies offer much potential benefit. However, central to any conversation relating to the application of such technologies are certain ethical, legal, and social difficulties around their application. The recent misuse, or inappropriate use, by certain Chinese actors of the application of genome editing technologies has been, of late, well noted and described. Consequently, caution is expressed by various policy experts, scientists, bioethicists, and members of the public with regard to the appropriate use of human germline genome editing (...) and its possible future effect on future generations.Main textAs concerns about the applications of heritable genome editing have grown, so too have the questions around what is to be done to curtail ‘rogue actors’. This paper explores various ways in which to regulate genomic editing that are socially beneficial, while being cognisant of legal and ethical principles and rights values. This is done by evolving regulatory frameworks across jurisdictions in an attempt to raise issues, address common principles, and set responsible standards for stewardship of the novel technology.ConclusionsIt is suggested that robust and concrete regulatory measures be introduced that are culturally and contextually sensitive, inclusive, appropriate, and trustworthy – and are based on public empowerment and human rights objectives. Doing so will ensure that we are perfectly positioned to harness and promote the benefits that novel technologies have to offer, while safeguarding public health and curtailing the ambitions of rogue actors. This it is acknowledged is no easy task, so, as a point of departure, this paper sets out a path forward by means of certain, practical recommendations – by constructing genome editing regulation in a manner that both fulfils the desire to better progress human health and that can withstand legal and ethical scrutiny.The following observations and recommendations are made: Firstly, that a solution of effective, legitimate governance should consist of a combination of national and supranational legislative regulation or ‘hard’ law, in combination with ‘soft’ ethics, firmly anchored in and underpinned by human rights values. Second, that efforts to support legal and ethical solutions should be rigorous, practical, and robust, contribute to a reaffirmation of human rights in a contextually sensitive manner, and be transnational in reach. Lastly, that greater harmonisation across jurisdictions and increased public engagement be sought. This it is proposed will address the question of how to implement a normative framework which in turn can prevent future rogue actors. (shrink)

With its roots in clinical and educational psychology, school psychology is an ever-changing field that encompasses a diversity of topics. The Oxford Handbook of School Psychology synthesizes the most vital and relevant literature in all of these areas, producing a state-of-the-art, authoritative resource for practitioners, researchers, and parents.Comprising chapters authored by the leading figures in school psychology, The Oxford Handbook of School Psychology focuses on the significant issues, new developments, and scientific findings that continue to change the practical landscape. The (...) handbook's focuses include:allegiance to the reciprocal relationship between science and practice to promote problem-solving and enrichment modelsservice delivery designed to improve competencies of all studentsthe relationship between general cognitive ability and important life outcomesthe development of viable and enduring educational, family, and community systems to support studentsincreasing student diversity and the necessity of increased sensitivity to the influences of social, cultural, political, and legislative variables of schoolingoutlining tenable reasons why, since the end of World War II, children from kindergarten through the secondary grades have generally not been the recipients of a superior or efficient educational systemall relevant legislation, including the No Child Left Behind Act, and the ongoing question of who or what is responsible for the inadequate academic preparation of inner-city childrenbuilding a cumulative knowledge base to better facilitate students' academic, social, and personal competencies including the promotion of positive mental health and subjective well-beingThe scholarship compiled here is a must-read for practitioners, students, and faculty, and an ideal resource for parents seeking a scientific approach to the efficacy of school psychology practices. In both breadth and depth, this handbook promises to serve as the benchmark reference work for years to come. (shrink)

Bertrand’s paradox ) can be considered as a cautionary memento, to practitioners and students of probability calculus alike, of the possible ambiguous meaning of the term ‘at random’ when the sample space of events is continuous. It deals with the existence of different possible answers to the following question: what is the probability that a chord, drawn at random in a circle of radius R, is longer than the side of an inscribed equilateral triangle? Physics can help to remove (...) the ambiguity by identifying an actual experiment, whose outcome is obviously unique and prescribes the physical variables to which the term ‘random’ can be correctly applied. In this paper, after briefly describing Bertrand’s paradox, we associate it with an experiment, which is basically a variation of the famous Buffon’s needle experiment for estimating the value of π. Its outcome is compared with the analytic predictions of probability calculus, that is with the probability distribution of variables whose uniform distribution can be considered a sound implementation of complete randomness. (shrink)